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THE REVISED ABA GUIDELINES AND THE DUTIES OF




On February 10, 2003, the American Bar Association
approved the revised edition of its Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases.' Their purpose is to articulate the "national
standard of practice for the defense of capital cases" ;2 they "are
not aspirational. Instead, they embody the current consensus
about what is required to provide effective defense
* Copyright 2003 Eric M. Freedman. All rights reserved. Permission is hereby granted to
nonprofit institutions to reproduce this work for classroom use, provided that credit is
given on each copy to the author and this publication.
** Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law (LAWEMF@Hofstra.edu), B.A.
1975, Yale University; M.A. 1977, Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand); J.D.
1979, Yale University. Professor Freedman, who is active as a capital litigator and is the
author of Habeas Corpus: Rethinking the Great Writ of Liberty (N.Y.U. Press 2002),
served as Reporter for the American Bar Association's Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (rev. ed., ABA 2003). The
opinions expressed in this article are his own.
1. See ABA, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases (rev. ed., ABA 2003) (adopted Feb. 10, 2003), reprinted in 31
Hofstra L. Rev. 913 (2003) [hereinafter Guidelines]. The black-letter Guidelines, which
represent the official position of the ABA, are accompanied by a lengthy and heavily
documented Commentary [hereinafter Commentary], which, though unofficial, "serves as
a useful explanation of the black-letter guidelines." Id. at 914. Both documents represent a
distillation of the combined experiences of many individuals actively at work in different
aspects of the field, see id. at 914-16 (Acknowledgments and Introduction). The issue of
the Hofstra Law Review in which the Guidelines and Commentary are reprinted also
contains individual commentaries by various outside authors, some of which are referred to
later in this article.
2. Guidelines, supra n. 1, at 919 (Guideline 1.I.A).
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representation in capital cases." 3 Because the ABA does not
oppose the death penalty but does believe in justice,4 it sets as its
bedrock criterion the principle that "any jurisdiction wishing to
impose a death sentence must at minimum provide
representation that comports with these Guidelines." 5
Significantly for the special concerns of this issue of the
Journal, the Guidelines
apply from the moment the client is taken into custody and
extend to all stages of every case in which the jurisdiction
may be entitled to seek the death penalty, including...
post-conviction review,' clemency proceedings, and any
connected litigation.
As detailed in the three Parts of this Article that follow, a review
of the revised Guidelines with a special focus on their
implications for capital post-conviction proceedings reveals that:
3. Commentary, supra n. 1, at 920. See Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2536-37
(2003) (relying on non-compliance with the prevailing norms of practice reflected in first
edition of Guidelines to support holding of ineffective assistance of counsel).
4. Except for opposing execution of persons who are mentally retarded or were under
18 at the time of their crimes, the ABA "takes no position on the death penalty"; it simply
calls upon all jurisdictions wishing to retain capital punishment to comply with a series of
policies-including the Guidelines-intended to insure due process and minimize the risk
of execution of the innocent. See http://www.abanet.org/moratoriumlresolution.html
(containing both ABA resolution of Feb. 3, 1997, which embodies this position, and links
to relevant policies) (accessed Sept. 29, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
5. Commentary, supra n. 1, at 938.
6. As explained in Definitional Note 5 to Guideline 1.1, see Guidelines, supra n. 1, at
920, the term "post-conviction review" is not limited to state and federal proceedings in
the nature of habeas corpus. Rather,
[t]he term "post-conviction" is a general one, including (a) all stages of direct
appeal within the jurisdiction and certiorari, (b) all stages of state collateral
review proceedings (however denominated under state law) and certiorari, (c) all
stages of federal collateral review proceedings, however denominated (ordinarily
petitions for writs of habeas corpus or motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, but
including all applications of similar purport, e.g., for writ of error coram nobis),
and including all applications for action by the Courts of Appeals or the United
States Supreme Court (commonly certiorari, but also, e.g., applications for
original writs of habeas corpus, applications for certificates of probable cause),
and all applications for interlocutory relief (e.g. stay of execution, appointment
of counsel) in connection with any of the foregoing, and (d) all requests, in any
form, for pardons, reprieves, commutations, or similar relief made to executive
officials, and also applications to administrative or judicial bodies in connection
with such requests.
Id.
7. Guidelines, supra n. 1, at 919 (Guideline 1.1.B).
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1. There is a right to the effective assistance of counsel
beyond direct appeal. The conventional wisdom, that the federal
Constitution guarantees no such right and therefore none exists,
is flawed on multiple levels. It is a perilous foundation on which
to ground any legal conclusion, and an unacceptable one on
which to build a just system for adjudicating capital cases.
2. The defense bar will need to expand its traditional
concept of what constitutes a lawyering task, and recognize that
lead counsel in a properly conducted death penalty case is the
captain of a defense team of lawyers and non-lawyers deployed
to pursue the best interests of the client For example, a lawyer
who fails to conduct a broad-ranging investigation of both the
guilt and penalty phases-taking responsibility for duties
traditionally relegated to forensic experts or social workers or,
more commonly, not performed at all-is ineffective. 9 Similarly,
an effective capital post-conviction lawyer does not just
litigate-although he or she most certainly does litigate, and to a
greater degree than traditionally recognized'-but also pursues
with vigor the possibility of an agreed-upon disposition of the
case, seeking that goal through a variety of means.
3. Judges'3 will need to- recognize the foregoing in
compensating counsel and other members of the defense team.
8. See Guidelines, supra n. 1, at 952 (Guideline 4.1), 999 (Guideline 10.4);
Commentary, supra n. I, at 955-58 (detailing "The Team Approach to Capital Defense");
see also infra at 337-41.
9. See infra at 335-37.
10. See Commentary, supra n. 1, at 923-24 (discussed infra at 343).
11. See Guidelines, supra n. 1, at 1035 (Guideline 10.9.1: "Counsel at every stage of
the case have an obligation to take all steps that may be appropriate in the exercise of
professional judgment in accordance with these Guidelines to achieve an agreed-upon
disposition."); see also Russell Stetler, Commentary on Counsel's Duty to Seek and
Negotiate a Disposition in Capital Cases (ABA Guideline 10.9.1), 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 1157
(2003).
12. The Guidelines mandate that counsel pursue discussions not only with the
prosecutor and the client (notwithstanding the reluctance of either to engage in them, see
Guidelines, supra n. I, at 1038 (Guideline 10.9. .E)), but also with appropriate members of
the client's family and representatives of the victim, and that counsel not only act in person
but also engage appropriate intermediaries. See Commentary, supra n. 1, at 1008-09, 1042,
1046.
13. This comment is addressed to judges in the expectation that, for the medium term,
they will continue in most jurisdictions to have principal responsibility for the appointment
and compensation of defense counsel. The revised Guidelines, however, call upon death
penalty jurisdictions to create agencies to perform these functions that are "independent of
the judiciary," Guidelines, supra n. 1, at 944 (Guideline 3. 1.B). This aspect of the
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Realistically, this will involve a significant increase in the
amount of resources currently provided. 4 That is the ineluctable
consequence of a simple fact: "The death penalty is
expensive."' 5 But only by paying its costs can we have
confidence in the appropriateness of executions that will
ultimately be carried out in the name of all of us. Money paid for
effective post-conviction representation in capital cases is not a
windfall bestowed upon defense lawyers but rather an
investment in the system of justice.'6
II. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL:
A LEGAL RIGHT THAT IMPROVES THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
In applying a uniform standard of competence to capital
defense lawyers from the moment of arrest through final action
on executive clemency, the Guidelines recognize current legal
and practical realities.
Although, to be sure, as a matter of formal doctrine there is
presently no federal constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel to pursue collateral attacks on state capital convictions,
the case on which that proposition rests is shaky at best,'7 and
Guidelines is the subject of Ronald Tabak's commentary in the special issue of the Hofstra
Law Review in which the Guidelines and Commentary appear. See Ronald J. Tabak, Why
an Independent Appointing Authority Is Necessary to Choose Counsel for Indigent People
in Capital Punishment Cases, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 1105 (2003).
14. The Commentary reiterates existing ABA policy that "[a]s a rough benchmark,
jurisdictions should provide funding for defender services that maintains parity between the
defense and the prosecution." Commentary, supra n. 1, at 985. It then goes on to note that,
in fact, "[s]tudies indicate that funding for prosecution is, on the average, three times
greater than funding that is provided for defense services at both the state and federal
levels." Id. at n. 135.
15. Eric M. Freedman, Add Resources and Apply Them Systemically: Governments'
Responsibilities Under the Revised ABA Capital Representation Guidelines, 31 Hofstra L.
Rev. 1097, 1097 (2003).
16. See Commentary, supra n. 1, at 987 (noting that inadequate representation in state
post-conviction proceedings may preclude inmates' ability to gain federal review of their
claims: "It is such inmates-and the justice system-rather than lawyers (who can always
move to more lucrative fields) that are victimized when jurisdictions fail to fulfill their
financial responsibilities."); see also infra at 345.
17. In Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. I (1989), a four-one-four lineup of the Court did
reject the claim of the petitioner before it to a constitutional right to the appointment of
counsel to pursue his state post-conviction remedies, but the controlling opinion of Justice
Kennedy suggested that such a right might exist in certain factual circumstances. See
Murray, 492 U.S. at 14-15 (emphasizing that concurrence is based "[oln the facts and
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unlikely to survive the vigorous attacks that will surely be
leveled at it in the years to come. 8 In light of the accumulated
experience of the intervening years reflected in the Guidelines,'9
the Justices' recent expressed concerns about the quality of
defense representation in capital cases, 0 and the renewed vigor
with which the Court has scrutinized the performance of
counsel,2' there is a good chance that within the next few years
this precedent will be radically narrowed if not overruled
outright. Even if the federal constitutional proposition endures,
its practical effect will predictably be undermined by a series of
developments in state and federal law that render it irrelevant.
22
record of this case," in which "no prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable to
obtain counsel to represent him in postconviction proceedings, and Virginia's prison
system is staffed with institutional lawyers to assist in preparing petitions for
postconviction relief').
There are states today where a prisoner could make the showing that Justice Kennedy
described. For example, since Alabama has no system at all for insuring that Death Row
inmates receive post-conviction representation, Thomas D. Archer was without counsel for
more than two years after his direct appeal and came within a day of execution before an
emergency rescue by the federal courts. See Arthur v. Haley, 248 F.3d 1302 (11 th Cir.
2001); Agency Claims Death Row Inmates Without Lawyers a Growing Problem, Times
Free Press (Chattanooga, Tenn.) B8 (March 26, 2001). See also Leonard Post, On Their
Own. In Alabama, Some Inmates Don't Have Lawyers as They Near the Last Bid for Life,
26 Nati. L. J. 1 (Dec. 1, 2003).
The Commentary, supra n. I, at 1081 n. 333, aptly describes Arthur as "an instance of
legal Russian roulette," and encourages counsel "to be aggressive in challenging such
irresponsible behavior by the states as a federal constitutional violation."
18. See Commentary, supra n. 1, at 933 n. 47 (advising counsel to "continue to test the
boundaries of Murray"). The Court could plausibly re-visit the case from the viewpoints,
among others, of the Sixth Amendment (right to counsel), Eighth Amendment
(distinguishing capital proceedings from others), or Fourteenth Amendment (due process
right to counsel before adverse state action; access to the courts), see Christopher Flood,
Closing the Circle. Case v. Nebraska and the Future of Habeas Reform, 27 N.Y.U. Rev. L.
& Soc. Change 633, 658-660 (2001-02) (explicating argument on due process theory).
19. See Commentary, supra n. I, at 932 n. 47 (documenting states' poor performance in
providing post-conviction counsel and collecting scholarly commentary critical of that
performance); see also Freedman, supra n. 15, at 1100 n. II (listing federal cases since
1996 finding inadequacies in state systems for providing capital post-conviction counsel).
20. See Commentary, supra n. 1, at 928-29.
21. See infra at 332-33.
22. The ABA's campaign for adoption of the revised Guidelines, announced at Hofstra
Law School on October 24, 2003, see Leigh Jones, ABA Launches Effort to Improve
Capital Case Defense, N.Y.L.J. 1 (Oct. 27, 2003), is likely to have an impact in some
jurisdictions.
Some states may infer a right to effective post-conviction representation in capital
cases from state constitutions, see e.g. Jackson v. State, 732 So. 2d 187 (Miss. 1999), or
state statutes providing for the appointment of such counsel, see Commentary, supra n. 1,
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More generally, courts can be expected to develop law in
response to facts, 3 and, as the following discussion indicates, the
factual case for a right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel in capital cases is overwhelming.
Simply put: "Quality representation in both state and
federal court is essential if erroneous convictions and sentences
are to be corrected. 24  The Commentary documents this
proposition at some length,25  but the bottom line is
straightforward. The most comprehensive available data show
that of every hundred death sentences imposed, sixty-eight
percent do not survive post-conviction review; forty-seven
percent are reversed at the state level (roughly forty-one percent
on direct appeal and six percent on state collateral attack), and a
further twenty-one percent on federal habeas corpus.26
These statistics, moreover, come from a system which has
hardly been loath to allow procedural considerations to foreclose
at 941 n. 74 (listing cases). And even if they do not, the existence of such statutes may
support federal entitlements. See e.g. Ake v. Okla., 470 U.S. 68, 78 n. 4 (1985) (collecting
state statutes making expert psychiatric assistance available to indigent defendants as
support for holding that due process requires provision of such assistance); see also
Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to the Effective Assistance of Capital
Postconviction Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of Capital
Counsel, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 31 (arguing that once jurisdiction creates statutory right to
post-conviction counsel, Constitution requires it to provide effective counsel).
Federal law provides for the appointment of qualified counsel in habeas corpus
proceedings challenging state capital convictions, see 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (1988), and
defendants may be able to challenge deficient attorney performance as a statutory violation.
See Cooey v. Bradshaw, 216 F.R.D. 408 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (granting stay of execution on
claim of ineffective assistance by prior counsel appointed under § 848), motion to vacate
stay denied, No. 03-4001 (6th Cir. July 24, 2003), motion to vacate stay denied, No. 03-
5472 (U.S. July 24, 2003).
23. See e.g. Henderson v. Sargent, 926 F.2d 706, 711, 712 (8th Cir. 1991) (granting
writ where trial counsel's performance at guilt phase was ineffective because it lacked "an
adequate investigation of the facts of the case, consideration of viable theories, and
development of evidence to support those theories," and state post-conviction counsel was
ineffective for failing to perform full analysis of "trial testimony and the police record"
and conducting "interviews with the persons who testified at trial or had firsthand
knowledge of the events surrounding the murder"); People v. Johnson, 609 N.E.2d 304,
311-12 (111. 1993) (holding state post-conviction counsel ineffective for failing to interview
witnesses that client claimed trial attorneys should have called).
24. Commentary, supra n. 1, at 932.
25. See id. at 932-36.
26. See Commentary, supra n. 1, at 932 n. 46 (citing James S. Liebman, Jeffrey A.
Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, pt. I,
app. A, at 5-6 (2000)).
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review of the merits,27 which has until recently been willing to
uphold as effective a level of performance that most people
would consider appalling malpractice if displayed by the lawyer
28they had engaged to assist them in the purchase of a new home,
and which-not unconnectedly-has seen a frightening number
of cases in which the system has acknowledged coming to the
brink of executing an innocent person.29
The implications are twofold:
* Jurisdictions must create mechanisms to provide effective
assistance of counsel throughout the pendency of a capital
case;30 and
e Judges must recognize the right to such assistance both in
reviewing attacks on the performance of counsel at prior
stages of the proceeding, and in providing funding for post-
conviction counsel appearing before them.3  To do
otherwise will not only render convictions vulnerable to
27. See Commentary, supra n. 1, at 936 n. 57 (quoting description of habeas doctrine
by Linda Greenhouse of The New York Times: "so complex as to be almost theological").
See also Eric M. Freedman, Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, in America's
Experiment with Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Past, Present, and Future of the
Ultimate Penal Sanction 553, 567 (James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm & Charles S. Lanier,
eds., 2d ed., Carolina Academic Press 2003) (describing "the creation of a legalistic maze
of restrictions on the availability of the habeas corpus remedy").
28. See Commentary, supra n. 1, at 928-29, 928 n. 29, 930, 930 n. 37 (documenting
current profound and pervasive set of problems with the quality of defense representation
in death penalty cases at trial level, and showing that under the extremely deferential
standards set out by the Supreme Court for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, "even seriously deficient performance all too rarely leads to reversal"); id. at 933
n. 47 (documenting ineffective performance by counsel at state post-conviction level). The
most recent developments are discussed infra at 332-33.
29. See Innocence and the Death Penalty (Death Penalty Info. Ctr. 1997-2003)
(including information about cases of Ill people who have, since 1973, "been released
from death row with evidence of their innocence") (available at http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/article.php?did=412&scid=6) (accessed Oct. 27, 2003; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
30. The obligation of each death penalty jurisdiction to create structures within which
counsel are able to perform effectively is the subject of my commentary in the special issue
of the Hofstra Law Review. See Freedman, supra n. 15. The focus of the present Article, in
contrast, is on the obligations of lawyers and judges in the context of individual post-
conviction litigations. For while "[n]either the problem of ineffective representation nor
the solution to it ultimately lies at the level of the individual case ... it is at that level that
the problems become visible and the solutions must be implemented." Id. at 1102-03.
31. See infra at 341-45.
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subsequent reversal, but-far more importantly-
undermine the justice and reliability, real and perceived, of
case outcomes. The premise of the Guidelines since their
inception has been that
[a]ll actors in the system share an interest in the
effective performance of [capital post-conviction]
counsel; such performance vindicates the rights of
defendants, enables judges to have confidence in their
work, and assures the states that their death sentences
are justly imposed."
III. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL:
THE STANDARD OF PRACTICE
Among the judges who must depend on the quality of
counsel's work in death penalty cases are the Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States. This may or may not be
related to a new willingness on the part of that Court to give
teeth, in the capital context at least, to a constitutional standard
for the effective performance of counsel that has hitherto been
universally denounced as flaccid.33
In Williams v. Taylor, 4 counsel at the penalty phase of a
capital trial were held ineffective for failing to uncover and
present evidence of defendant's "nightmarish childhood,"
borderline mental retardation, and good conduct in prison.35
Their performance, the Court held, violated the obligation of
32. This quotation, which I have described as encapsulating "the philosophy that has
animated the [Guidelines] project since its inception in the 1980s," Eric M. Freedman,
Introduction, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 903, 912 (2003), is from a report released by the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 1989. See Comm. on Civ. Rights, Assn.
of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Legislative Modification of Federal Habeas Corpus in
Capital Cases, 44 Rec. of the Assn. of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 848, 854 (1989)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter Legislative Modification].
33. The governing case is Strickland v. Wash., 466 U.S. 668 (1984). From the date on
which it was decided until the year 2000, when the Williams case, discussed in the next
paragraph of text, was decided, the Court had never found any attorney ineffective under
Strickland. For criticisms of Strickland, and in particular of its insufficiency to insure
representation that conforms to "the special standard of practice applicable to capital
cases," Commentary, supra n. 1, at 991, see id. at 930-31, and at 991 n. 155.
34. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
35. Williams, 529 U.S. at 395-96.
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counsel in a capital case "to conduct a thorough investigation of
the defendant's background."36
Then came Wiggins v. Smith.37 In what seems to have been
a deliberate effort to reinforce the message of Williams,38 the
Court by a vote of seven to two "took a major step toward
dealing with the pervasive and persistent problem of inadequate
representation for indigent capital murder defendants."39 Trial
counsel in Wiggins were held ineffective because, although they
did uncover some mitigation evidence, their investigation was
inadequate; it "fell short of the standards for capital defense
work articulated by the American Bar Association-standards to
which we lon have referred as 'guides to determining what is
reasonable.' 4  Counsel "acquired only a rudimentary
knowledge of [the client's] history from a narrow set of
sources," notwithstanding the "well-defined norms" -
embodied in the 1989 edition of the Guidelines-calling for an
investigation, inter alia, into "medical history, educational
history, employment and training history, family and social
history, prior adult and juvenile correctional experience, and
religious and cultural influences."4
While the case has a variety of ramifications,42 the key
point for present purposes is that Mr. Wiggins's right to the
36. Id. (citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed. 1980)).
37. 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003).
38. See Marcia Coyle, New Standards in Death Cases; High Court Rules on Effective
Counsel, 25 Natil. L.J. P1, PI (July 14, 2003) ("The promise of Williams-to put teeth into
the Strickland standards-has not been fulfilled, according to some scholars and litigators.
But Wiggins, they added, will not be so easily ignored by lower courts."). This view finds
support in the fact that Justice O'Connor wrote both Strickland and Wiggins, reinforcing
the point that the former will have to be read in light of the latter. See also Commentary,
supra n. 1, at 929 (quoting Justice O'Connor's concerns, expressed in a 2001 speech, that
the system "may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be executed" and
suggesting that "[p]erhaps it's time to look at minimum standards for appointed counsel in
death cases and adequate compensation for appointed counsel when they are used").
39. Coyle, supra n. 38, at 1.
40. Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2536-37 (quoting Strickland).
41. Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2537 (quoting Guideline 11.8.6 of the 1989 edition)
(emphasis omitted). For the extensively annotated discussion of these topics in the revised
edition, see Commentary, supra n. 1, at 1018-26.
42. A notable aspect of the decision is its treatment of the Anti-terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The Wiggins Court-again reinforcing what it had
done in Williams-held that the rulings of the state courts rejecting the claim of ineffective
assistance represented an unreasonable application of Strickland that rested upon "an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court
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effective performance of trial counsel was only vindicated by
the work of post-conviction counsel, who complied with their
obligations under the Guidelines and did what trial counsel
ought to have done.43
Although this is precisely why the obligations of the
Guidelines (including, but not limited to, the "obligation to
conduct thorough and independent investigations relating to
issues of both guilt and penalty" )44 apply "to all stages" of
every capital case,45 the practical effect is that post-conviction
counsel face a truly daunting task:
The post-conviction handling of capital cases is a legal
specialty requiring mastery of an intricate body of fast-
changing substantive and procedural law.... Furthermore,
taking on such a case means making a commitment to the
full legal and factual evaluation of two very different
proceedings (guilt and sentencing) in circumstances where
the client is likely to be the subject of intense public
hostility, where the state has devoted maximum resources
to the prosecution, and where one must endure the draining
emotional effects of one's personal responsibility for the
outcome.46
Moreover, the lawyer is dealing with a uniquely
challenging client population:
Anyone who has just been arrested and charged with capital
murder is likely to be in a state of extreme anxiety. Many
capital defendants are, in addition, severely impaired in
ways that make effective communication difficult. They
may have mental illnesses or personality disorders that
proceedings." See Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2534-35, 2538-39. These rulings, predicates
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) to the grant of relief, should encourage federal habeas corpus
courts to follow the example set in Wiggins by the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland and to engage in a more intensive review than many of them have
recently felt at liberty to perform. Thus, for instance, in Frazier v. Huffrnan, 343 F.3d 780,
797-99 (6th Cir. 2003), the Court of Appeals, relying on Williams and Wiggins, reversed
the District Court and granted habeas relief on the basis of trial counsel's failure to present
mitigating evidence of brain damage. The Sixth Circuit "conclude[d] that the state court's
determination that Frazier's trial counsel had performed in a competent manner during the
penalty phase was not simply erroneous, but unreasonable." Id. at 797.
43. See infra at 341-45.
44. Guidelines, supra n. 1, at 1015 (Guideline 10.7.A).
45. Id. at 919 (Guideline 1. 1.B)
46. Legislative Modification, supra n. 32, at 854 (footnote omitted); see also
Commentary, supra n. 1, at 923.
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make them highly distrustful or impair their reasoning and
perception of reality; they may be mentally retarded or have
other cognitive impairments that affect their judgment and
understanding; they may be depressed and even suicidal; or
they may be in complete denial in the face of
overwhelming evidence. In fact, the prevalence of mental
illness and impaired reasoning is so high in the capital
defendant population that "[i]t must be assumed that the
client is emotionally and intellectually impaired."47
These special characteristics of the Death Row population
exacerbate the "significant cultural and/or language barriers
between the client and his lawyers" 48 that are likely to exist in
criminal defense work generally. Yet,
[o]vercoming barriers to communication and establishing a
rapport with the client are critical to effective
representation. Even apart from the need to obtain vital
information, the lawyer must understand the client and his
life history. To communicate effectively on the client's
behalf in negotiating a plea .... arguing to a post-
conviction court, or urging clemency, counsel must be able• 49
to humanize the defendant•.
The response of the Guidelines to this multiplicity of
difficulties is to launch a comprehensive attack on them-
requiring counsel both to pursue a multi-front strategy on behalf
of the client and to deploy a multi-disciplinary team to execute
it.
A. Pursuing a Multi-Front Strategy
Victory in a capital case may take many forms and occur
for many reasons. The client might be exonerated because new
evidence emerges or old evidence proves unreliable.0 He may
47. Commentary, supra n. 1, at 1007 (quoting Rick Kammen & Lee Norton, Plea
Agreements: Working with Capital Defendants, in 22 The Advocate (Mar. 2000) (available
at http://www.dpa.state.ky.us/library/advocate/marO0/plea.html) (accessed Sept. 30, 2003;
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process)).
48. Corunentary, supra n. 1, at 1007.
49. Commentary, supra n. 1, at 1009 (footnotes omitted).
50. See Commentary, supra n. 1, at 1018 (detailing counsel's duty "to take seriously
the possibility of the client's innocence," notwithstanding an apparently overwhelming
case of guilt, "to scrutinize carefully the quality of the state's case, and to investigate and
re-investigate all possible defenses").
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gain a lesser sentence as a result of a favorable legal ruling or
because new developments cause the prosecutor to agree.5 The
Governor might grant clemency.52 None of these events are
likely to be the result of spontaneous generation. They will
happen because counsel took action to make them happen.
During the years consumed in a typical capital case, it will often
be the duty of counsel to pursue more than one of these
possibilities simultaneously,53  cultivating seeds whose
germination may be distant.
Counsel must discharge this duty with a self-conscious
awareness of the unique context in which capital representation
occurs. In spending time to build a relationship with someone in
a position to influence a key actor54-and, most certainly, in
spending a good deal of time with the client himself-a lawyer
is doing work that is every bit as "legal" as filing an application
for a writ of prohibition. 5 The Guidelines stress the importance
of this work during the post-conviction phase:
[P]ost-conviction counsel, from direct appeal through
clemency, must not only consult with the client but also
monitor the client's personal condition for potential legal
51. See Commentary, supra n. I, at 1040 ("As in other sorts of protracted litigation,
circumstances change over time (e.g., through replacement of a prosecutor, death of a
prosecution witness, alteration in viewpoint of a key family member of the client or the
victim, favorable developments in the law or the litigation, reconsideration by the client)
and as they do new possibilities arise."); see also id. at 1040 n. 243 (describing many
instances of negotiated settlements following extended litigation).
52. See Commentary, supra n. I, at 1088-90 (describing duties of clemency counsel).
53. See e.g. Guidelines, supra n. 1, at 1038 (Guideline 10.9.I.G); Commentary, supra
n. 1, at 1043 (explicating this Guideline: "If the possibility of a negotiated disposition is
rejected by either the prosecution or the client when a settlement appears to counsel to be
in the client's best interest, counsel should continue efforts at persuasion while also
continuing to litigate the case vigorously.")
54. Examples might include members of "the client's family or others on whom the
client relies for support and advice," Commentary, supra n. 1, at 1008, or a cleric who
might reach out to the victim's family, see Commentary, supra n. I, at 1042.
55. See Guidelines, supra n. I, at 1005 (Guideline 10.5: "Relationship With the
Client"); see also Commentary, supra n. 1, at 1008 (describing importance of ongoing
personal contact; by establishing "a relationship of trust with the client" counsel can obtain
all the facts relevant to "appeal, post-conviction review, or clemency" and "ensure that the
client will listen to counsel's advice" on key strategic matters). See also id. at 1009 n. 182
(Because a lawyer "can ... frequently earn a client's trust by assisting him with problems
he encounters in prison, or otherwise demonstrating concern for his well being and a
willingness to advocate for him ... [,] such advocacy is an appropriate part of the role of
defense counsel in a capital case.").
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consequences. For example, actions by prison authorities
(e.g., solitary confinement, administration of psychotropic
medications) may impede the ability to present the client as
a witness .... and changes in the client's mental state (e.g.,
as a result of the breakup of a close relationship or a
worsening physical condition) may bear upon his capacity
to assist counsel and, ultimately, to be executed. 56 In any
event, .... maintaining an ongoing relationship with the
client minimizes the possibility that he will engage in
counter-productive behavior (e.g., attempt to drop appeals,
act out before a judge, confess to the media). Thus, the
failure to maintain such a relationship is professionally
irresponsible.5 7
In short, to pursue a multi-level strategy in a capital case,
counsel must be intensely engaged not just in the nuances of the
facts and the law but also in the human environment within
which they will interact to achieve a just outcome for the client.
B. Deploying a Multi-Disciplinary Team
As a great deal of unhappy experience shows,58 expecting
one, or even several, lawyers to have the skills needed to
perform well all the tasks that are required to deliver high-
quality defense representation to a capital defendant is
unrealistic. 9 Rather,
the provision of high quality legal representation in capital
cases requires a team approach that combines the different
skills, experience, and perspectives of several disciplines.
The team approach enhances the quality of representation
by expanding the knowledge base available to prepare and
present the case, increases efficiency by allowing attorneys
to delegate many time-consuming tasks, .. . improves the
relationship with the client and his family by providing
56. The Commentary notes in this regard that "the case establishing the proposition
that insane persons cannot be executed," Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1966), "was
heavily based on notes on the client's mental status that counsel had kept over a period of
months," Commentary, supra n. I, at 1083.
57. Id. at 1010-11 (footnotes omitted).
58. See id. at 928-29.
59. See Freedman, supra n. 15, at 1102 ("Even a skilled lawyer making best efforts to
defend her client competently is probably engaged in a foredoomed project if she is not
part of a system that provides her with the back-up necessary to perform effectively.").
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more avenues of communication, and provides more
support to individual team members. 6°
The Guidelines accordingly provide that, at every stage of
the case, the client must be represented by a defense team
consisting of:
e one lead counsel and one or more associate counsel;
9 at least one investigator;
* at least one mitigation specialist;
* at least one person (who may be one of the foregoing)
"qualified by training and experience to screen individuals
for the presence of mental or psychological disorders or
impairments" ; and
*"any other members needed to provide high quality legal
representation." "
As the Commentary-relying upon professional standards,
empirical experience, and many decided cases regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel-demonstrates at some length,
these requirements represent the standard of practice. Indeed, as
the following sections summarize, the mandates of the
Guidelines flow logically from the tasks that defense counsel are
expected to perform.
60. Commentary, supra n. 1, at 1002 (footnotes omitted).
61. Guidelines, supra n. I, at 1000 (Guideline 10.4: "The Defense Team").
62. Id.; see also Pamela Blume Leonard, A New Profession for an Old Need: Why a
Mitigation Specialist Must Be Included on the Capital Defense Team, 31 Hofstra L. Rev.
1143 (2003); Jill Miller, The Defense Team in Capital Cases, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 1117
(2003). The Guidelines contemplate that the need for appropriate expertise on the defense
team may require the provision of legal, as well as non-legal, resources beyond the
minimum requirements: "Most cases will require at least some contributions by additional
lawyers-for example, a specialist to assist with motions practice and record preservation,
or an attorney who is particularly knowledgeable about an area of scientific evidence."
Commentary, supra n. 1, at 1004 (footnote omitted).
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1. The Investigator"
The assistance of an investigator who has received
specialized training is indispensable to discovering and
developing the facts that must be unearthed at trial or in post-
conviction proceedings. Although some investigative tasks, such
as assessing the credibility of key trial witnesses, appropriately
lie within the domain of counsel, the prevailing national
standard of practice forbids counsel from shouldering primary
responsibility for the investigation. Counsel lacks the special
expertise required to accomplish the high-quality investigation
to which a capital defendant is entitled and simply has too many
other duties to discharge in preparing the case. Moreover, the
defense may need to call the person who conducted the
interview as a trial witness.
2. The Mitigation Specialist
A mitigation specialist is also an indispensable member of
the defense team. Mitigation specialists possess clinical and
information-gathering skills and training that most lawyers
simply do not have. They have the time and the ability to elicit
sensitive, embarrassing and often humiliating evidence (e.g.,
family sexual abuse) that the defendant may have never
disclosed. They have the clinical skills to recognize such things
as congenital, mental or neurological conditions, to understand
how these conditions may have affected the defendant's
development and behavior, and to identify the most appropriate
experts to examine the defendant or testify on his behalf. As in
Wiggins,64 the mitigation specialist compiles a comprehensive
and well-documented psycho-social history of the client based
on an exhaustive investigation; analyzes the significance of the
information in terms of impact on development, including effect
on personality and behavior; finds mitigating themes in the
client's life history; identifies the need for expert assistance;
assists in locating appropriate experts; provides social-history
information to experts to enable them to conduct competent and
63. This sub-section (1), and sub-section (2), which follows, are both drawn from the
Commentary, supra n. 1, at 958-60.
64. See infra at 344.
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reliable evaluations; and works with the defense team and
experts to develop a comprehensive and cohesive case in
mitigation. The mitigation specialist often plays an important
role as well in maintaining close contact with the client and his
family while the case is pending. The rapport developed in this
process can be the key to persuading a client to accept a plea to a
sentence less than death.
3. The Mental-Impairment Expert
Manifestly, some team member must be "qualified by
training and experience to screen individuals for the X resence of
mental or psychological disorders or impairments." Counsel's
own observation of the client, his family members, and other
witnesses, can hardly be expected to be sufficient to detect the
array of conditions (e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder, fetal
alcohol syndrome, pesticide poisoning, lead poisoning,
schizophrenia, mental retardation") that could be vitallyimportant.
4. The Additional Experts and Specialists
Beyond the core requirements, each case will have unique
needs. The provision of effective representation may require
counsel to work with forensic scientists, 67 translators, medical
and mental-health specialists of various kinds,68  or
anthropologists.6 9 Counsel bears the heavy responsibility of
65. Guidelines, supra n. 1, at 952 (Guideline 4. I.A.2).
66. As noted in Commentary, supra n. I, at 1009 n. 183, mental retardation is a
condition of critical legal significance, see Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding
that Constitution prohibits execution of mentally retarded individuals), but one which the
client "may conceal with great skill."
67. See Commentary, supra n. 1, at 955 (listing as examples "pathologists, serologists,
microanalysts, DNA analysts, ballistics specialists").
68. See e.g. Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
although counsel consulted four experts, including a medical doctor, a psychologist, and a
psychiatrist, they were ineffective in failing to consult a neurologist or toxicologist who
could have explained the neurological effects of defendant's extensive exposure to
pesticides).
69. See Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 616-18, 617 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1992) (positive
testimony from defendant's family, combined with expert testimony about difficulty of
adolescent immigrants from Hong Kong assimilating to North America, would have
humanized client and could have resulted in a life sentence for defendant convicted of
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determining what expertise the case needs, obtaining it, and
turning the results into persuasive presentations to all relevant
decisionmakers.
IV. ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF POST-CONVICTION
COUNSEL ON THE GROUND
The ultimate beneficiary of effective post-conviction
lawyering by capital defense counsel is the justice system itself.
But the effective performance that "vindicates the rights of
defendants, enables judges to have confidence in their work, and
assures the states that their death sentences are justly
imposed,"7o costs money. "For better or worse, a system for the
provision of defense services in capital cases will get what it
pays for."7
Since at the moment it is judges who control the flow of
funding to defense counsel in most of the states where the crisis
in post-conviction capital representation is most acute, it is
judges who are the most urgent audience for this message.
Defense teams facing the challenges of post-conviction
representation described in Part III above simply cannot do their
jobs without the resources that will enable them to (a) find
compelling facts, (b) pursue promising legal theories, and (c)
engage in persuasive advocacy.
1. Finding Compelling Facts
By definition, a lawyer cannot know what an investigation
will turn up until the investigation is done-that is precisely why
one investigates. Not every aspect of the prior proceedings will
turn out to be unreliable, but the odds are good that some aspects
will. Yet what those are cannot be predicted.72 It is for this
reason that the Guidelines require counsel at every stage to:
thirteen murders). See also Lynn Thompson, Life Without Parole in Massacre: Mak
Sentenced Again for 13 Wah Mee Deaths in 1983, Seattle Times BI (May 21, 2002)
(reporting that defendant was sentenced to thirteen life terms after prosecution decided not
to appeal judge's order that death penalty was unavailable).
70. Legislative Modification, supra n. 32, at 854.
71. Commentary, supra n. 1, at 988.
72. See e.g. Gwen Filosa, N.O. Man Cleared in '84 Murder, Times-Picayune 1 (May 9,
2003) (describing case of John Thompson, who was deterred from taking the stand at his
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e "conduct thorough and independent investigations
relating to issues of both guilt and penalty" ;73
* "conduct a full examination of the defense provided to
the client at all prior phases of the case" ;14 and
* "satisfy themselves independently that the official record
of the proceedings is complete and to supplement it as
appropriate." 75
If post-conviction review is to achieve its goal of insuring
reliable results, judges must support counsel financially in
performing this work. For example, it makes no sense for a
federal judge to limit the investigations of habeas counsel to
issues exhausted in state court or treated on the merits there. One
of counsel's primary duties is to uncover issues that have not
been previously presented; if counsel does, then-depending on
the facts-it may well be the case that the resulting claims may
be heard on the merits.76 Similarly, an otherwise preclusive
procedural bar will not bar a federal habeas court from reaching
the merits where "a constitutional violation has probably
murder trial by a prior conviction for armed robbery, which, a defense investigator
discovered weeks before the execution date, had been tainted by government suppression
of an exculpatory blood test; when retried on the murder charge, Thompson, who had
always maintained his innocence, was acquitted).
73. Guidelines, supra n. I, at 1015 (Guideline 10.7.A).
74. Id. (Guideline 10.7.B.1).
75. Id. (Guideline 10.7.B.2).
76. See e.g. Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357 (1993) (per curiam) (granting certiorari and
holding previously unasserted claim not precluded because petitioner properly relied on
state's representation that critical transcript did not exist); Graves v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d
465, 476 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that District Court erred in finding petitioner's claim
under Brady v. Md., 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to be procedurally barred, notwithstanding the fact
that state courts had rejected it on the basis that it was not raised until his third application
for postconviction relief). To take another example, the AEDPA states that a federal court
should ordinarily not hold an evidentiary hearing "if the applicant has failed to develop the
factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). But the
statutory bar does not apply "unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault,
attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,
432 (2000). Moreover, even if the statute does apply, the court may still hold a hearing "if
efforts to discover the facts would have been in vain, see § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii), and there is a
convincing claim of innocence, see § 2254(e)(2)(B)." 529 U.S. at 435; see also 529 U.S. at
440 (holding that, because state post-conviction counsel had been sufficiently diligent,
petitioner was entitled to present new material to the federal court). All of these elements,
of course, turn on issues of fact that post-conviction counsel must investigate.
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resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent" 77-a
fact-sensitive issue indeed, and one only likely to be resolved
after extraordinary efforts by counsel.8
2. Pursuing Promising Legal Theories
Just as counsel must lay the factual groundwork for
meritorious claims, so must they lay the legal groundwork. For
example, in Johnson v. Mississippi 79 the petitioner's death
sentence was set aside because it had been predicated on an
invalid conviction in New York. But that result occurred only
after his counsel had successfully brought an action to vacate the
New York conviction. 0 Under the Guidelines, it was counsel's
duty to bring the New York action as an aspect of the
Mississippi representation,8' and they were entitled to be
compensated for doing so.
3. Engaging in Persuasive Advocacy
Once the facts have been obtained and the legal theories
formulated, they have to be presented in a forceful way that
77. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). For an example of a petitioner
successfully relying upon this rule, see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
78. Thus, for example, before hiring an expert to do DNA testing, counsel may have to
bring an action to obtain DNA samples to test. See e.g. Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287
(1 th Cir. 2002) (cited in Commentary, supra n. 1, at 1031 n. 231). Generalizing from this
example, the cited footnote of Commentary continues by admonishing
defense attorneys to be aggressive in pursuing the implication of the Court's
assumption in Herrerra v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993), "that in a capital
case a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial
would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal
habeas relief if there was no state avenue open to process such a claim." See
House v. Bell, 311 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
2575 (2003) (relying upon this passage and opinion of Justice O'Connor in
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), in certifying to state courts issue of
whether procedural vehicle existed to present to them evidence of innocence first
uncovered during federal habeas proceedings).
Commentary, supra n. 1, at 1031 n. 231.
79. 486 U.S. 578 (1988) (discussed in Commentary, supra n. 1, at 924 n. 7).
80. See People v. Johnson, 506 N.E.2d 1177 (N.Y. 1987) (per curiam).
81. See Commentary, supra n. 1, at 927 n. 22 (noting that the ruling in Lackawanna
County Dist. Atty. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001), "may well require counsel," as part of
their "obligation to prevent the prosecution from using unconstitutionally obtained prior
convictions in support of a death sentence," to bring "collateral challenges to such prior
convictions in the jurisdictions or districts where those convictions were obtained").
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causes the decisionmaker to form a new picture of the case.82
Thus, for example, in Wiggins, a key element in persuading the
Supreme Court that trial counsel had performed inadequately at
the mitigation phase was the presentation on state post-
conviction of "an elaborate social history report" by an expert
social worker. 3 The "detailed" and "graphic" evidence in this
report-buttressed by "state social services, medical, and school
records, as well as interviews with petitioner and numerous
family members"-" chronicled petitioner's bleak life history"
and powerfully demonstrated the case that trial counsel had
failed to make.84 Under the Guidelines, that social worker-
surely a most valuable member of the defense team-was
entitled to remuneration for his efforts.85
With a Supreme Court opinion in hand to sharpen
hindsight, coming to this conclusion is easy. But at the time
during the post-conviction process when resource decisions need
to be made, neither the post-conviction counsel seeking funding
nor the judges passing on the requests can know what course a
litigation will ultimately take. Counsel's work on the many
factual, legal and relational tasks for which they are responsible
needs to lay the groundwork for a variety of possible courses of
action. 6 For the effective advocacy mandated by the Guidelines
82. See Commentary, supra n. 1, at 1085 ("Ultimately, winning collateral relief in
capital cases will require changing the picture that has previously been presented. The old
facts and legal arguments-those which resulted in a conviction and imposition of the
ultimate punishment, both affirmed on appeal-are unlikely to motivate a collateral court
to make the effort required to stop the momentum the case has already gained in rolling
through the legal system.").
83. See Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2532-33.
84. Id.
85. See Guidelines, supra n. I, at 981 (Guideline 9. I.C: "Non-attorney members of the
defense team should be fully compensated at a rate that is commensurate with the provision
of high quality legal representation and reflects the specialized skills needed by those who
assist counsel with the litigation of death penalty cases.") Of course, this entitlement would
be not a whit diminished if the purpose of the presentation had not been to persuade the
post-conviction court to grant legal relief, but rather the prosecutor to accept a plea. See
supra at 335.
86. See id. This is particularly so in light of the especially strong duty of capital counsel
to pursue legal claims, even ones whose "prospects of immediate success on the merits are
at best modest," Commentary, supra n. 1, at 1033-34; see also Monroe H. Freedman, The
Professional Obligation to Raise Frivolous Issues in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hofstra L.
Rev. 1167 (2003).
That duty is based on decades of experience with the vagaries of death-penalty law,
see e.g. Commentary, supra n. I, at 928 n. 28 (pointing out that within a single week in the
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to become a reality, judges must recognize this need and support
counsel financially in exploring a range of strategies."
4. Investing in Justice
Will all this cost money? Yes. But the decision to have "a
criminal justice system in which death is available as a sanction
necessarily entails substantially higher costs than the contrary
decision does,"88 and one of those costs is the cost of providing
defendants at "all stages of every case in which the jurisdiction
may be entitled to seek the death penalty" with high-quality
legal representation.89 If governments do not pay that cost in
money, defendants will pay it in injustice.90 Reflecting the norms
of the legal community, the Guidelines deem that alternative
unacceptable.
spring of 2002 the Supreme Court rendered two major decisions favorable to capital
defendants (Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 503, 304 (2002) (barring execution of the mentally
retarded) and Ring v. Ariz., 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (expanding requirements for jury findings
in capital cases)), both of which squarely overruled contrary precedent; in the interests of
clients, counsel should have been asserting "these claims at every stage in the proceedings,
notwithstanding that they were then plainly at odds with the governing law."). See
Commentary, supra n. 1, at 1032:
Because of the possibility that the client will be sentenced to death, counsel must
be significantly more vigilant about litigating all potential issues at all levels in a
capital case than in any other case.... [C]ounsel also has a duty ... to preserve
issues calling for a change in existing precedent; the client's life may well
depend on how zealously counsel discharges this duty. Counsel should object to
anything that appears unfair or unjust even if it involves challenging well-
accepted practices.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Indeed, recognizing that "[a]n effective capital defense lawyer is always testing-and
often explicitly challenging-the limits of existing law," the Commentary "specifically
identifies many areas in which it would be remiss for counsel to accept uncritically the
contours of existing doctrine." Freedman, supra n. 32, at 904, 904 n. II (listing examples).
87. See Commentary, supra n. 1, at 957 (In providing resources, jurisdictions should
bear in mind "counsel's need to explore the potential of a variety of possible theories.").
88. Freedman, supra n. 15, at 1097-98.
89. Guidelines, supra n. 1, at 919 (Guideline 1.1 .B).
90. It is for this reason that the Guidelines mandate that "counsel at all stages...
demand on behalf of the client all resources necessary to provide high quality legal
representation [and if] such resources are denied . . . make an adequate record to preserve
the issue for further review," Guidelines, supra n. I, at 1001 (Guideline 10.4.D).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
V. CONCLUSION
Post-conviction review in capital cases is a critical
"safeguard against injustice." 9' It can only function as such if
defense lawyers, supported by judges, provide high-quality legal
representation. The Guidelines are a roadmap for both groups to
follow in achieving that goal.
91. Commentary, supra n. 1, at 931.
